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1 Introduction
In their survey of the economic literature on racial discrimination Lang and Lehmann
(2012) document persistent differences in employment and wages across black and white
workers in the United States (U.S.). They argue that negative black-white employment
and wage gaps are the two main empirical regularities a model of discrimination should
seek to replicate.1 Critically, their review of the evidence suggests these gaps vary con-
siderably by skill. In particular, wage gaps ‘are smaller or nonexistent for very high-skill
workers ’ and employment gaps are ‘somewhat smaller among high-skill than among low-
skill workers ’ (p.12). The authors also assess the ability of existing discrimination models
to replicate these facts. They conclude that ‘no existing [discrimination] model can fully
explain these regularities ’ (idem).
In this paper we develop a model of discrimination that successfully replicates these
regularities. We show that a model of taste-based employer discrimination can deliver si-
multaneously mean black-white wage and employment gaps, as well as a decreasing profile
of these gaps as the skill of workers increases.2 Recent evidence in the economics liter-
ature suggests labor market discrimination remains a plausible hypothesis to rationalize
observed wage and employment gaps across races (see Fryer et al. (2013)). Correspon-
dence and audit studies find pervasive evidence of unequal treatment of black workers
vis-a-vis seemingly equally skilled white workers (see Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004)
and Charles and Guryan (2011)). The latest evidence produced by regression-based stud-
ies using the methodology proposed by Neal and Johnson (1996) points to the conclusion
that, although differences in premarket factors are likely to play a major role in explaining
observed mean black-white wage gaps, a substantial wage gap remains after controlling
for premarket factors (Lang and Lehmann, 2012). Ritter and Taylor (2011) use Neal
and Johnson’s methodology to measure the importance of premarket factors for observed
mean black-white employment gaps and also find that a substantial gap remains after
controlling for premarket factors and a number of other variables.3
1In this literature wage gaps are defined as one minus the ratio of mean black to white wages, whereas
employment gaps refer to the percentage-point difference between mean white and black employment
rates.
2We are not claiming that the model developed in this paper is the only one that can successfully
replicate these empirical regularities. In fact, recent models of customer taste-based discrimination and
statistical discrimination can also replicate those patterns (see Cavounidis and Lang (2016) and Decreuse
and Tarasonis (2016)).
3Neal’s and Johnson’s investigation of the role of premarket factors in explaining mean black-white
wage gaps had a major impact in the literature. In that study the authors argue that controlling for
differences in premarket factors (measured by the Armed Forces Qualification Test at an individual’s
young age) can fully explain the mean wage gap across blacks and whites in the U.S. As mentioned in
the main text, recent evidence (see Carneiro et al. (2005) and Lang and Manove (2011)) suggests a more
nuanced view of the importance of premarket factors.
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Two competing approaches dominate the economic literature on discrimination: prej-
udice or taste-based models, pioneered by Becker (1971), and models of statistical discrim-
ination, starting with Phelps (1972) and Arrow et al. (1973).4 Despite the voluminous
empirical literature on racial discrimination, there is no systematic evidence pointing to
one approach as being more plausible than the other (Charles and Guryan (2011) and
Lang and Lehmann (2012)). We find both approaches theoretically compelling and exist-
ing evidence suggests both are important to rationalize the data. However, in this paper
we set statistical discrimination aside and focus only on the consequences of taste-based
discrimination for differences in labor market outcomes of blacks and whites. In particu-
lar, we build on a modeling approach that combines employer taste-based discrimination
and random search frictions to describe differences in labor market outcomes of workers
who differ in terms of a nonproductive attribute (e.g. race or gender). The assumption
of search frictions is a natural modeling choice in this context, since there are sizable
differences in mean unemployment durations of black and white individuals.
Previous models in the discrimination literature have shown how the combination of
taste-based discrimination and random search frictions generates mean employment and
wage differentials across races.5 The central intuition is the following. Consider an econ-
omy populated by two types of workers (who differ by race) and two types of employers,
where one type (prejudiced) incurs a utility cost from hiring a black worker. Since preju-
dice reduces the match value between prejudiced employers and black workers, the match-
ing opportunities of black workers are smaller compared to those of white workers. Under
random search, black workers cannot direct their search away from prejudiced employers
(their probability of meeting a prejudiced employer is the same as that of whites), so in
this setup black workers have lower employment prospects compared to white workers.
This delivers mean employment differentials across races. Lower employment prospects
in turn imply black workers have lower reservations values. Since all employers know it
takes longer for black workers to find a job, they will take advantage of that and offer
black workers lower wages. This delivers mean racial wage differentials.
To generate wage and employment gaps that are smaller for high-skill workers com-
pared to low-skill workers we extend this modeling approach in two directions. We start
by assuming that workers and firms differ respectively in their levels of skill and technol-
ogy and that the production value of the match is a complementary function of firms’
and workers’ skill levels. Under production complementarities and capacity constraints,
4The literature that followed Phelps (1972) focuses on the possibility that blacks’ productivity is more
difficult to observe than that of whites, while the literature that builds on Arrow et al. (1973) stresses
the effects of differences in employers’ beliefs about blacks’ and whites’ productivity.
5This result was first shown in Black (1995).
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in equilibrium, high(low)-skill workers will be matched more frequently with high(low)-
technology firms. In other words, there will be positive assortative matching on skill. Be-
cause production is also an increasing function of workers’ and firms’ skill levels, matches
involving high-skill workers will involve higher levels of production. If we further assume
the utility cost for prejudiced employers of employing a black worker is constant, then the
cost of prejudice represents a smaller share of the value of matches as the skill of workers
increases. This will translate into lower employment and wage differentials across races
as the level of workers’ skill increases.
The model developed in this paper shares several features with other models of taste-
based discrimination in a random search environment, like Black (1995), Bowlus and
Eckstein (2002), Rose´n (2003) and Flabbi (2010).6 In all these models prejudiced employ-
ers incur a psychic cost of employing a worker who belongs to the minority group.7 Our
model setup differs from these papers by assuming two-sided skill heterogeneity, produc-
tion complementarities and endogenous vacancy posting. These assumptions have strong
empirical support. The analysis of matched employer-employee data sets over the past
two decades established the importance of both worker and firm unobserved heterogene-
ity to explain observed differences in wages across workers (see Abowd et al. (1999) and
Lopes De Melo (forthcoming)). Production complementarities are increasingly seen as a
plausible description of the production technology in modern labor markets.8 Although
this question is not fully settled, there is a growing consensus that positive sorting on skill
is an important feature of labor markets. Lastly, the assumption of endogenous vacancy
posting is supported by evidence on the empirical relevance of an aggregate matching
function in the U.S. labor market and on firms’ response to changes in vacancy filling
rates (see Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001), Borowczyk-Martins et al. (2013) and Davis
et al. (2013)).
We estimate the model using various sources of publicly available data for the U.S.
manufacturing sector.9 A critical feature the model must satisfy to make its empirical
6We only refer to papers based on a similar modeling approach. See Lang and Lehmann (2012) for a
comprehensive review of all discrimination models.
7Black (1995) assumes prejudiced employers never match with black workers. Bowlus and Eckstein
(2002) develop a wage posting model and allow both types of worker to draw their productivity from
separate (degenerate) distributions. Rose´n (2003) and Flabbi (2010) model the productivity of the match
(and not of workers and jobs) as being heterogeneous.
8Shimer and Smith (2000) established the equivalence between a specific form of production comple-
mentarities and positive assortative matching in a random search environment, generalizing the famous
result in a competitive setup put forth by Becker (1973). Several papers in the applied search literature
have tried to measure the sign and strength of assortative matching in skill nonparametrically (see Abowd
et al. (1999), Eeckhout and Kircher (2011), Lopes De Melo (forthcoming) and Hagedorn et al. (2017)),
or estimate the degree of skill complementarities in production using a structural approach (see Bagger
and Lentz (2016) and Lise et al. (2016)).
9Two-sided skill heterogeneity is a distinctive feature of the model that calls for an estimation strategy
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implementation plausible is to allow for the possibility that black and white workers have
different skill distributions. Indeed, there is substantive evidence of persistent black-white
gaps in educational attainment and cognitive skill (see Neal (2006) and Fryer Jr (2011)),
which suggests differences in skill across races are likely to play an important role in
shaping mean employment and wage differentials. Other models of taste-based employer
discrimination have been estimated using structural methods (see Bowlus and Eckstein
(2002) and Flabbi (2010)). However, our paper is the first to take to the data a search-
discrimination model based on Shimer and Smith’s (2000) two-sided skill heterogeneity
partnership model. An important distinction of our estimation strategy with respect
to other papers in the literature is that prejudice and skill differences are identified by
matching jointly wage and unemployment-to-job transition moments.
To empirically distinguish between education and skill, we separately estimate the
model among low- and high-educated individuals (those without any college education
and those with some college education or more, respectively). We find stark differences in
the relative importance of prejudice and skill differences across races to explain differences
in wages and job finding rates. For those without a college degree, we estimate that
57% of potential employers are prejudiced and that the utility cost of employing a black
worker is about 7 dollars per hour. In terms of skill, blacks and whites are estimated
to be quite homogeneous, with the average white worker being 1.4% more skilled than
his black counterpart. In contrast, among those with some college education, prejudice
is much more concentrated (only 31% of potential employers are prejudiced) and milder
(the disutility of employing a black worker is $1.4), whereas these workers are considerably
more heterogeneous in terms of their productive abilities (both within and between races).
The average black worker is close to 14% less productive than the equivalent white worker.
We use the estimated model to gauge the effectiveness of alternative policy approaches
to improve labor market outcomes of black vis-a-vis white workers. In our counterfactual
experiments, we consider two types of policies: enforcement of the equal treatment prin-
ciple and programs aimed at reducing the premarket skill racial gap. Since our model
features free entry of jobs, the effects of different policies are analyzed taking labor de-
mand adjustment into account. Our results suggest policies can improve labor market
outcomes of black workers without large decreases in social welfare.
The rest of the paper is structured in the following way. In Section 2 we present
the theoretical model and derive its main properties. Section 3 describes the data. The
estimation procedure is presented in detail in Section 4. Section 5 describes the fit of
based on matched employer-employee data. Unfortunately, at the time we started this project there was
no matched employer-employee database for the U.S. labor market accessible for researchers based outside
the U.S.
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the model and reports parameter estimates. In Section 6 we simulate the estimated
model to provide an interpretation of observed cross-racial differences in wages and job
finding rates. Section 7 undertakes counterfactual analysis of different policies. Section 8
concludes.
2 Model
The model we develop in this section builds on Shimer and Smith’s (2000) partnership
model, extending it to a labor market where some employers are prejudiced vis-a-vis a
specific type of workers and in which there is free entry of jobs. Because the model
applies to any market where some employers are prejudiced against a certain type of
worker, we will adopt a more general terminology in this section and return to the racial
discrimination application in the estimation section. Section 2.7 contains the main results
of interest. It describes the properties of the equilibrium in the extended model — what
we call a dual sorting equilibrium. The sections that precede Section 2.7 set out the model
in detail and discuss the relevance of the model’s assumptions to study discrimination in
the labor market.
2.1 Environment
We consider a labor market with L workers and G jobs. The number of jobs G is de-
termined in equilibrium while L is given. There exist two types of employers and two
types of workers. A share m of workers are of type-1 and a share (1−m) of them are of
type-2, with worker types being denoted by index i = 1, 2. Similarly, a share pi of jobs
are operated by prejudiced employers (P ) and a share (1−pi) by nonprejudiced ones (N),
with index j = P,N . In this model one firm is one job. Thus, throughout the text we
use the terms jobs, employers and firms interchangeably. In addition, workers differ in
terms of skill, h, and firms in terms of technology (efficiency of labor inputs), x. We as-
sume these distributions (often simply referred to as ‘skill distributions’) are uniform, i.e.
h ∼ U [0, 1] and x ∼ U [0, 1]). We 10 Let `i(h) and gj(x) denote respectively the population
measures of type-i workers of skill h and type-j firms of technology x.11 The endogenous
measures of type-i unemployed workers of skill h and type-j vacant firms of technology
x are respectively denoted ui(h) and v
j(x), with total measures of type-i unemployed
workers and type-j vacant jobs given respectively by ui =
∫
ui(h) dh and v
j =
∫
vj(x) dx.
10These assumptions about the supports and densities of the distributions are normalizations. In the
empirical application we allow distributions to be defined over distinct supports and their densities to be
non-uniform. Since we assume the production function is increasing in worker’s/firms’ skill/technology,
one can think of h and x as the ranks of the underlying skill/technology distributions.
11So that mL =
∫
`1(h) dh and piG =
∫
gP (x) dx.
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Time is continuous and both workers and employers are risk neutral, with discount
rate ρ. Employers and workers maximize the present discounted value of future utility
streams, measured in monetary terms. As in Becker (1971), prejudiced employers incur a
psychic cost d of employing a type-2 worker. While this assumption (a constant disutility
of prejudice) is standard in the literature, in a setting with two-sided skill heterogeneity,
a more general specification would allow the degree of prejudice to vary with employers’
technology.12 In terms of the main motivating empirical pattern of the paper (decreasing
wage and employment gaps in workers’ skill), our model is able to replicate it under the
assumption that d is positively (though not perfectly) related to employers’ skill. However,
under that assumption, and given our data, we can no longer confidently separately
identify prejudice from average skill differences, which is a central goal of the paper.13
The match flow output depends on the worker’s type and skill and on the firm’s
technology, denoted fi(h, x) and satisfying certain regularity conditions (see A).
14 We
take complementarities in skill as a descriptive feature of modern labor markets and so
assume a supermodular production function.15 This means the own marginal product of
any worker and job is increasing in his partner’s skill. Formal details are provided in A.16
We assume that only unemployed workers and vacant firms search for a partner. By
assuming that workers cannot search on the job we are potentially eliminating an impor-
tant source of observed wage differentials between blacks and whites. The main reason
why we do not include this mechanism in our model is because we lack the necessary
data to inform it in a meaningful way. A limitation of the data set we use in this paper
(the Current Population Survey, CPS) is that we do not observe wages for the same indi-
vidual before and immediately following a job change. Therefore, any inference we were
to make regarding wage changes after a job-to-job transition would be entirely driven
12A constant disutility of prejudice is standard in search models of taste-based discrimination with
bargaining and match-specific heterogeneity (see Rose´n (2003) and Flabbi (2010)), as well as in search
models with wage posting (see Bowlus and Eckstein (2002)).
13In the context of our empirical application, to our best knowledge, there is no direct evidence that
points to a specific relationship between employer’s technology and the intensity of racial prejudice. Since
d is a preference parameter, it is fundamentally unobservable. The type of evidence that is usually used
to directly measure the extent of prejudice (or racial attitudes) is based on survey data and questions that
involve a yes-or-no answer (whether respondents would vote for a black president or approve interracial
marriage). While we find this evidence useful to describe the evolution of aggregate long-run trends
and spatial differences across countries or states (as for example Lang and Lehmann (2012) and Charles
and Guryan (2008) do), it is not straightforward to map the answers to those questions onto an exact
specification of the relationship between prejudice and firms’ technology.
14The worker’s type influences output only if there are differences in the skill distributions across types.
15There is a growing consensus in the applied search literature on the descriptive relevance of positive
assortative matching (see Lise et al. (2016), Lopes De Melo (forthcoming) and Bagger and Lentz (2016)).
16In our empirical application we assume a specific degree of skill complementarities. However, the
model, as well as the equilibrium characterization described in Section 2.7, hold with any production
function that satisfies the regularity conditions and supermodularity.
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by the chosen wage determination structure. For wages of entrants from unemployment,
Nash bargaining with unemployment as a threat point is a common assumption in the
literature. However, how wages are determined following a job-to-job transition employed
really needs to be disciplined by data. For example, papers by Cahuc et al. (2006), Hage-
dorn et al. (2017) and Bradley and Kuegler (2017) all use the same wage determination
mechanism as ourselves for those hired from unemployment, but assume three different
mechanisms for wage changes associated with job switches. Therefore, while recognizing
that on-the-job search is a potentially very important channel to understand how prejudice
translates onto differential racial outcomes along workers’ careers, we deem the innova-
tions in our model worthy of a separate analysis and so leave this important extension for
future research.
Job offers and unemployed job applicants arrive respectively to unemployed workers
and vacant firms following a Poisson process. At each point in time the job and unem-
ployed arrival rates are a function of the number of searchers on each side of the market
via the aggregate meeting function M(u1 + u2, v
P + vN). In the meeting process, type-1
and type-2 workers, and type-N and type-P firms, are perfect substitutes. Meeting is
random and vacant jobs and unemployed workers of different types and skills are effec-
tively exposed to the same arrival rates, respectively λW = M(u1+u2,v
P+vN )
u1+u2
for workers,
and λF = M(u1+u2,v
P+vN )
vP+vN
for jobs.
Once a firm and a worker meet they decide whether or not to form a match. We
define a match indicator function αji (h, x), which is equal to 1 if a type-i worker of skill h
and a type-j firm of technology x decide to match upon meeting. Matches are randomly
destroyed by a Poisson process with arrival rate δ, in which case both the worker and the
firm join the pool of searchers. This job destruction rate is assumed constant. We assume
away differences in δ across types because it affects sorting patterns, via changes in the
relative value of matches across types, and therefore differences in job finding rates. If
matches with a specific worker type have shorter expected durations, employers will take
this into account when deciding whether or not to form a match. This effectively imposes
another source of discrimination at the hiring stage, which is not modeled, and that also
affects the complementarities between the worker’s type and a firm’s output.17
2.2 Value Functions
Having defined the setup, we can now write each agents’ payoffs. A worker of type-i and
skill level h can be in one of two different states: employed or unemployed. The flow value
of employment when he is employed in a type-j firm of technology x is given by equation
17We discuss this point in more detail in section 4.2.1.
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(1):
ρW ji (h, x) = w
j
i (h, x) + δ
[
Ui (h)−W ji (h, x)
]
. (1)
, where wji (h, x) is the wage she earns in this job. The wage w
j
i (h, x) is endogenously
determined as the solution to a Nash bargaining game. Ui(h) denotes the worker’s value
of being unemployed.
While unemployed a worker receives a flow utility b, independent of his race, skill and
employment history. The value of unemployment reads as follows:
ρUi (h) = b+ λ
W
∑
j=P,N
∫
αji (h, x)
[
W ji (h, x)− Ui (h)
] vj (x)
vP + vN
dx, (2)
where v
j(x)
vP+vN
is the sampling probability of a vacant type-j job of technology x from the
pool of unmatched firms.
Firms can be in two states: vacant or filled. J ji (h, x) is the value of a job for a type-j
firm of technology x, filled with a type-i worker of skill h:
ρJ ji (h, x) = fi(h, x)− d1[(i,j)=(2,P )] − wji (h, x) + δ
[
V j (x)− J ji (h, x)
]
, (3)
where the indicator function 1[(i,j)=(2,P )] takes value 1 if the match involves a prejudiced
employer and a type-2 worker. The psychic cost d that a prejudiced employer incurs when
matching with a type-2 worker does not affect the production value of the match, but
it does affect the utility value of the match for a prejudiced employer. Because d enters
additively in the firm’s value function, the degree of prejudice is independent of workers’
and firms’ skill levels.
We assume that keeping a vacancy open is costless, but requires paying an upfront
sunk cost. Therefore, the value of posting a vacancy for a type-j firm of technology x,
V j (x), is given by the following equation:
ρV j (x) = λF
∑
i=1,2
∫
αji (h, x)
[
J ji (h, x)− V j (x)
] ui (h)
u1 + u2
dh, (4)
where ui(h)
u1+u2
is the probability of sampling an unemployed type-i worker of skill h from
the pool of unmatched workers.
2.3 Entry
We assume that jobs remain active in the market if the present discounted value of keeping
a job unfilled is nonnegative, i.e. if V j (x) ≥ 0. Since there is no flow cost associated with
keeping a vacancy open, by construction, this is always true. To determine the total mass
8
of active jobs in equilibrium, G, we assume a free entry condition, whereby new entrants
make the decision to enter behind a veil of ignorance, i.e. without knowledge of either
their productivity type x or their taste of prejudice (see Hopenhayn (1992)). In order to
enter firms must incur a fixed sunk cost, denoted κ. One can think of it as the required
capital investment to create a new job. After entry, vacancies stay open until they meet
an acceptable worker. The total mass of active jobs, G, is determined by equalizing the
expected value of opening a vacancy to the fixed cost, κ, as formalized in the equation
below:
pi
∫
V P (x)
gP (x)
piG
dx+ (1− pi)
∫
V N(x)
gN(x)
(1− pi)Gdx = κ. (5)
As equation (5) highlights, G directly affects the value of retaining an open vacancy.
Since the matching function has diminishing returns in the number of vacancies, as their
number of increases, the probability that an individual vacancy is filled decreases. This,
in turn, depresses the value of keeping a vacancy open.
Our model of entry departs from other search-discrimination models in the literature
by introducing free entry of jobs and endogenous meeting rates via an aggregate meeting
function. Like previous search-discrimination models, prejudiced and nonprejudiced firms
coexist on the market due to the presence of search frictions, and product market compe-
tition is not explicitly modeled. This is an important limitation of the model, insofar as
product market competition affects the equilibrium distribution of prejudiced and non-
prejudiced firms which, in turn, affects the existence and persistence of racial wage and
employment gaps. Becker (1971) famously conjectured that competitive forces (namely
competition in the product and capital markets) would drive prejudiced firms out of the
market in the long run. Addressing the long-run implications of product market com-
petition would require us to formalize the industry dynamics, including the processes of
ownership transfer and firm entry and exit, which would greatly complicate the model and
the estimation protocol. Therefore, while recognizing this limitation, we do not attempt
to address this question in the paper.18
18In a recent paper, Ederington and Sandford (2016) assess Becker (1971)’s long-run prediction on the
survival of prejudiced firms by formalizing a model of industry dynamics with prejudiced and nonpreju-
diced firms. Their findings offer a more nuanced view of Gary Becker’s prediction. In their concluding
remarks they write: ‘Indeed, we show that some degree of market power (driven by product differentiation
across firms in our model) is necessary for discriminatory firms to exist even in the short run. However,
we also prove that the cost structure of an industry is of equal importance in explaining the survival
of discriminating firms. Specifically, we show that, even in industries characterized by low degrees of
market power (i.e., low levels of product differentiation and thus low price-cost margins), the presence
of high entry costs, low per-period entry costs and sequential entry can generate the long-run survival of
discriminatory firms).’ (p. 30).
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2.4 Match Surplus
From the four value functions written above, we can determine the total surplus generated
by any match. The surplus of a match between a type-i worker of skill h employed in
a type-j firm of technology x writes: Sji (h, x) = W
j
i (h, x) − Ui (h) + J ji (h, x) − V j (x),
and it is split between the worker and firm according to Nash bargaining. The worker
takes a share β and the firm a share (1− β) of the match surplus, implying the following
equalities:
Sji (h, x) =
J ji (h, x)− V j (x)
1− β =
W ji (h, x)− Ui (h)
β
. (6)
The wage equation that solves this bargaining problem is given by the following expression:
wji (h, x) = β
[
fi(h, x)− d1[(i,j)=(2,P )] − ρV j (x)
]
+ (1− β) ρUi (h) . (7)
Using equations (1) and (3), the expression for the total surplus can be rearranged and
expressed in the following way:
Sji (h, x) =
fi(h, x)− d1[(i,j)=(2,P )] − ρUi(h)− ρV j(x)
ρ+ δ
. (8)
Whenever the surplus is positive a match is formed. Formally, we denote this by an
indicator function:
αji (h, x) = 1
[
fi(h, x)− d1[(i,j)=(2,P )] − ρUi(h)− ρV j(x) > 0
]
. (9)
A first remark about the bargaining process is that we assume firms and workers of
different types have the same rent-sharing parameter. Allowing for different rent-sharing
parameters across worker types would introduce another degree of heterogeneity across
types. We choose not to follow this route. Instead, we take the view of the strategic
bargaining literature that rent-sharing parameters measure the relative impatience of
bargaining participants and see no reason for it to differ across worker types and/or skill
levels.19 Moreover, in the context of our model, absent taste-based discrimination (i.e.
if d were zero) a lower β for type-2 workers by itself would not generate employment
differences across worker types.
A second remark concerns the fact that d is transferable among match partners. This
means the psychic cost of prejudiced firms is observable by both parties in the match and
shared among them according to their rent-sharing parameters. We acknowledge that
alternative specifications (for instance, one in which d is nontransferable) may be equally
19Some papers interpret differences in rent-sharing parameters as the result of discrimination (see
Eckstein and Wolpin (1999) and Bartolucci (2013)).
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plausible. Although assuming a nontransferable d entails a somewhat different description
of how prejudice translates into discrimination, it implies similar properties to our chosen
specification. In particular, it also generates hiring and wage discrimination, as well as
higher employment and wage gaps for low-skill workers compared to high-skill workers.
2.5 Matching Sets
Having established the structure of agents’ payoffs, we can now define each agent’s strat-
egy. For a type-i worker of skill h her strategy is given by two sets, MPi (h) and MNi (h).
Similarly, a firm’s strategy is defined by two sets,Mj1(x) andMj2(x). An agent’s matching
sets contains all the acceptable partners with whom she is willing to match and who are
willing to match with her. The symmetry of matching sets is due to the surplus-sharing
rule being jointly privately efficient (i.e. the decision to match is mutually agreeable).
Using the indicator function αji (h, x) we can express each worker’s matching set as:
Mji (h) = {x |αji (h, x) = 1}, (10)
and each firm’s matching set as:
Mji (x) = {h |αji (h, x) = 1}. (11)
2.6 Steady-state Equilibrium
A steady-state equilibrium in this model is characterized by four conditions: (i) workers
and firms maximize their expected payoff, taking the strategies of all other agents as given;
(ii) agents decide to match if it increases their payoff; (iii) all measures of unmatched
workers of type-i and skill h and firms of type-j and technology x, respectively ui(h) and
vj(x), are in steady-state and (iv) in expectation the value of opening a vacancy is zero.
Conditions (i) and (ii) are given respectively by firms’ and workers’ value functions and
their matching sets. Condition (iv) is given by the free entry condition. We now state
the assumptions necessary to ensure condition (iii).
To fix the measures of unmatched agents, flow creation and flow destruction of matches
for every type of agent must exactly balance. This is given by the following set of equa-
tions:
λWαji (h, x)ui (h)
vj (x)
vP + vN
= δγji (h, x) , (12)
where γji (h, x) is a joint measure of matched type-i workers of skill h and type-j firms
of technology x. These equations ensure that, for every possible match between a worker
and firm of different types and skill levels, the number of matches being created at every
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point in time (the left-hand side of equation (12)) is exactly the same as the number of
matches being destroyed (the right-hand side of equation (12)). Then, by definition, the
steady-state stock of type-i employed workers of skill h is given by the following equation:
`i (h)− ui (h) =
∫
γNi (h, x) dx+
∫
γPi (h, x) dx. (13)
That is, the total population of type-i workers of skill h must equal the sum of its un-
employed and employed populations. Similarly, we can define the population of active
type-j firms of technology x by:
gj (x)− vj (x) =
∫
γj1 (h, x) dh+
∫
γj2 (h, x) dh (14)
so that, for each type-j firm of technology x, the total number of firms gj (x) is equal to
the total number of matched and vacant firms.
To obtain the equilibrium conditions of the model we first use the bargaining solution
(equation (6)) and firms’ and workers’ value functions to write each agent’s equilibrium
reservation value (equations (26) and (27)), where matching decisions satisfy equation (9).
We then use the flow-balance equations (equation (12)) and the population accounting
equations (equations (13) and 14) to express the equilibrium measures of unmatched
agents (equations (28) and (29)). Finally, the number of firms is determined by the
free-entry condition (equation (5)). The formal definition of equilibrium is given in B.
2.7 Dual Sorting Equilibrium
We now explore some implications of equilibrium for workers and jobs of different types
and skill levels. Proofs of stated results can be found in A. The results we present in this
section are characteristic of a class of equilibria where, for all possible combinations of
workers and firms of different types, some but not all matches are feasible. In other words,
equilibria in which, for any combination between a type-i worker and a type-j firm, some
matches between workers of skill h and firms of technology x are formed, but not for all
possible combinations of skill and technology levels. In practice this implies that, on the
one hand, the flow value of unemployment b and the psychic cost borne by prejudiced
employers d are sufficiently small with respect to the value of production fi(h, x), so that,
for all combinations of workers and firms of different types, there exist combinations of
skill levels (h, x) that satisfy the match feasibility condition. On the other hand, it implies
that, for certain combinations (h, x), the value of production fi(h, x) is small enough with
respect to b and d to render the match between them not feasible, where this holds for
12
any combination (type-i, type-j).20 In the various simulations of the model carried out
in the execution of the paper we always found equilibria satisfying this description.
An equilibrium in our model economy is characterized by two forms of sorting across
workers and jobs of different types and skill levels. To obtain positive assortative matching
in skill we assume the production function is supermodular. We do not prove formally
that, in our environment, assuming a supermodular production function implies positive
assortative matching. However, for all the simulations of the model we performed using
different ranges of parameter values, we always observe positive assortative matching in
skill. Regarding the second form of sorting – the patterns of negative assortative matching
between black/white workers and prejudiced/nonprejudiced employers – we are able to
establish some analytic results.
We start by establishing some basic definitions. In the economics literature, discrim-
ination is said to exist when equally productive workers are treated differently based on
nonproductivity related factors, such as race or gender (see Cain (1986)).21 In our model,
the psychic cost d reduces the utility value of the match for prejudiced employers, but,
importantly, it does not affect the production value of the match, so the way we model
discrimination is broadly consistent with the traditional definition studied in the litera-
ture. The first instance of economic discrimination we characterize pertains to workers’
wages.
Definition 1 (Wage Discrimination): A type-i worker of skill h experiences wage
discrimination if she is paid a lower wage than an equally able type-k 6= i worker when
both are matched with type-j firms with the same technology x, that is
for some (h, x), wji (h, x) < w
j
k 6=i(h, x).
The second instance of economic discrimination relates to agents decision of whom to
match with. In an economy with no match surplus losses due to prejudice, type-1 and
type-2 workers with the same skill match with firms within the same range of technology.
In an economy in which there is employer prejudice, in general, this is no longer the case
and the matching sets of two equally skilled workers of different types will differ. One
reason why these matching sets differ is due to hiring discrimination. Formally, we have
that:
20These two conditions can be stated formally in the following way: ∀(i, j) ∈ [1, 2] × [N,P ], ∃(h′, x′)
and (h′′, x′′) ∈ [0, 1]2 such that αji (h′, x′) = 1 and αji (h′′, x′′) = 0.
21As Cain (1986) emphasizes ‘although physical productivity excludes the psychic component [it] is
intended to be broad and to include such characteristics of the workers as their regularity in attendance
at work, dependability, cooperation, expected future productivity with the firm, and so on.’ (p. 695).
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Definition 2 (Hiring Discrimination): A type-i worker of skill h experiences hiring
discrimination if, upon meeting a firm of technology x of type-j, he is not hired, but an
equally skilled type-k 6= i worker is; that is,
for some (h, x), αji (h, x) = 0 and α
j
k 6=i(h, x) = 1.
To fix ideas, note that hiring discrimination describes discriminatory behavior by
employers that is materialized in the decision to hire a worker — a decision that is
different from that of how much to pay him (wage discrimination), but that stems from
the same cause, viz. prejudice. The first implication of our model is that, for a positive
value of d, type-P firms (those who are prejudiced) and type-2 workers (those who are the
object of prejudice) face worse prospects in the labor market compared to type-N firms
and type-1 workers, respectively. This result is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Outside Option Effects): If pi ∈ (0, 1) and d > 0, in any equilib-
rium:
(i) for a worker of skill h, the value of unemployment of a type-1 worker is higher than
that of a type-2 worker, that is, U1(h) > U2(h), ∀h; and
(ii) for a firm of technology x, the value of a vacancy to a type-N firm is higher than to
a type-P firm, that is, V N(x) > V P (x), ∀x.
A corollary of Proposition 1 is that, if there are any prejudiced employers in this model
economy, there will be wage discrimination against all type-2 workers.
Corollary 1 (Type-2 Wage Discrimination): If pi ∈ (0, 1) and d > 0, in any equi-
librium all type-2 workers experience wage discrimination in both types of firms of any
technological level.
So far we have established that, for prejudiced employers, the decision to match with
a type-2 worker differs from that of matching with an equally skilled type-1 worker in
two ways. First, the psychic cost d directly reduces the utility value of the match with a
type-2 worker. Second, type-2 workers have a lower outside option, which increases the
value of the match. Since the decision to match is only governed by the match surplus
condition (see equation (9)), matching between type-2 workers and type-P firms depends
on the relative magnitude of these two effects. We can show that, in our environment,
the presence of employer prejudice implies that some type-2 workers will not be hired by
certain prejudiced firms (the first effect dominates the second and it is high enough to
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reduce the match surplus to zero) and that those same firms will hire an equally able
type-1 worker. As stated in Definition 2 this combination of circumstances entails hiring
discrimination. The result is stated below.
Corollary 2 (Hiring Discrimination in Prejudiced Firms): If pi ∈ (0, 1) and
d > 0, some type-2 workers experience hiring discrimination by some prejudiced firms.
For nonprejudiced firms, the difference between matching with equally skilled type-1
and type-2 workers is only affected by the outside option effect. When the match surplus
condition between a nonprejudiced firm and a type-1 worker is not satisfied, the lower
outside option of an equally skilled type-2 worker may render that match feasible. We will
refer to this combination of circumstances as reverse hiring discrimination. This result is
stated below.
Corollary 3 (Hiring Discrimination in Nonprejudiced Firms): If pi ∈ (0, 1) and
d > 0, some type-1 workers experience hiring discrimination by some nonprejudiced firms.
3 Data
To estimate the model we use three sources of data: worker-level data, firm-level data
and market-level data. In the following paragraphs we describe these data sources and
the procedures we implemented to obtain the sample used in our estimation. The exact
moments used in the estimation are presented and discussed in Section 5.2.
The worker-level data comes from the CPS produced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
We pool the micro-data Basic Monthly extracts from January 2003 to December 2006 to
retrieve information on wages and transitions across labor market states.
Our sample selection procedure is as follows. First, we only include individuals who
declare themselves to be either black or white. Second, we only keep males in the sample
in order to avoid complications of modeling labor supply decisions and to be as precise as
possible about the type of prejudice we are estimating. We further restrict our sample to
individuals between the ages of 18 and 30 years old who remain active in the labor market
throughout their spell in the sample. Since we do not model wage growth (human capital
accumulation and search on the job), we believe our model is more adequate to interpret
differences in labor market outcomes among individuals who are at the beginning of their
career. Fourth, we only consider individuals in two labor market states: unemployed or
employed in a full-time job in the non-farm business sector. Last, to provide a correspon-
dence with our firm-level data, we restrict the sample to individuals who at some point
in time were employed in a manufacturing firm.
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Having defined the estimation sample, we split it in two education groups: those with
less than a college education (at most 12 years of schooling) and those with at least some
college education (more than 12 years of schooling). We do so based on the premise that
labor markets are segmented by broad education groups. This assumption is common in
the literature on structural estimation of job search models (see e.g. Lise et al. (2016)).
Table 1 presents summary statistics on the two sub-samples. The ‘No college’ (NC) sample
is composed of 9,540 males (8,464 whites and 1,076 blacks), whereas the ‘Some college’
(SC) sample is composed of 5,160 males (4,720 whites and 440 blacks). The share of blacks
is larger in the NC sample compared to the SC one. Both samples are quite homogenous
in terms of age and years of schooling, although SC whites are slightly older and more
educated than their black counterparts. This partly explains the larger black-white wage
and unemployment gaps. We will analyze these differences in more detail when describing
the model fit (see section 5.2).
We explore the longitudinal dimension of the CPS to measure individual transition
probabilities across employment and unemployment. We calculate average transitions
rates for the two sub-samples using the methodology proposed by Shimer (2012). Workers’
wages are measured at the household’s fourth and eighth months in the survey, when
information on usual weekly hours/earnings is recorded. To obtain hourly wages we use
reported usual hourly wages, when a worker is paid hourly, or usual weekly earnings
divided by usual weekly hours worked otherwise. Since wages are top-coded, we trim the
top and bottom 2% of the hourly wage distributions of black and white males.22
Our source of firm-level data is the Manufacturing Industry Database jointly produced
by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and the U.S. Census Bureau’s
Center for Economic Studies (CES). It contains annual industry-level data from 1958 to
2009 on output, employment and other variables for the 473 six-digit 1997 North American
Industry Classification System (NAICS) industries.23 To our knowledge, this is the only
publicly available data set for the U.S. with information on value-added. For each six-digit
industry we compute the average value-added per worker per hour and interpret it as the
level of production generated by the match between that worker-firm pair (i.e. fi(h, x)).
This means that, in our empirical application, technology differences across firms are only
explained by the six-digit industry at which they operate.
Finally, our sources of market-level data are the Job Openings and Labor Turnover
Survey (JOLTS), the CPS and the Current Employment Statistics (CES), available from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ webpage. We combine these data to obtain an estimate
22There is a literature about the misreporting of wages in the CPS. The main source of measurement
error is believed to be over reporting at low levels and under reporting at high levels (see Bollinger (1998)).
23See http://www.nber.org/nberces.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Estimation Samples
A. No college B. Some college
Whites Blacks Whites Blacks
(1) (2) (4) (5)
Age 24.47 24.40 26.26 26.09
(.14) (.42) (.15) (.46)
Years of schooling 11.02 11.37 15.19 14.66
(.07) (.13) (.08) (.24)
Unemployment rate 0.11 0.15 0.05 0.14
(.01) (.05) (.01) (.06)
Hourly wage 13.34 12.44 20.52 15.31
(.26) (.86) (.60) (1.30)
Number of observations 29875 3319 17270 1457
Number of males 8464 1076 4720 440
Notes. — Authors’ calculations based on Basic Monthly extracts of the Current Popula-
tion Survey, 2003-2006. Standard errors reported in parentheses. Age, years of schooling
and unemployment rates refer to January 2004. Hourly wages refer to 2004 Q1.
of labor market tightness in the same period in the manufacturing sector. Specifically, we
use the unadjusted series of job openings in the manufacturing sector from the JOLTS
(JTU30000000JOL), the unadjusted unemployment rate series in the manufacturing sec-
tor from the CPS (LNU03032232) and the series of unadjusted employment in the man-
ufacturing sector from the CES (CES3000000001).
4 Estimation Method
The relevant moments predicted by the model do not have a closed-form expression.
Therefore, we estimate the model’s parameters using a simulated method of moments
(SMM) estimator. Specifically, let θ denote the vector of structural parameters we seek
to estimate, mˆS(θ) the vector of model-generated moments and mˆN its empirical coun-
terpart. The estimation procedure finds θ such that the distance between the model-
generated moments and their empirical counterparts is as small as possible, according to
the following criterion function:
LN(θ) =
1
2
(
mˆN −mS(θ)
)′
Ω−1
(
mˆN −mS(θ)
)
. (15)
To obtain the theoretical moments we need to simulate the model. A description of the
standard simulation algorithm of the model is provided in C. The weighting matrix Ω
gives equal weight to all moments.24 Asymptotic standard errors are approximated using
24We also experimented with an optimal weighting matrix based on the variance-covariance matrix of
the bootstrapped moments. The estimation results are not very different but, because transition rates
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a first-order Taylor series, the details of which are provided in D.
4.1 Econometric Specification
In order to make the model developed in Section 2 empirically operational we make certain
parametric assumptions and calibrate some parameters. The monthly discount rate, ρ, is
set at 0.0043 (equivalent to 5% per year). The population shares of worker types, m and
(1 −m), are observed: they are simply the share of white and black workers in our two
samples (11.3 and vs 7.8% respectively for the NC and SC samples).
We specify the aggregate meeting function to be Cobb-Douglas with Constant Returns
to Scale (CRS) and meeting elasticities equal to 0.5, i.e. M(u1 + u2, v
P + vN) = λ(u1 +
u2)
0.5(vP +vN)0.5, where λ is the constant matching efficiency parameter to be estimated.
Since our model does not generate aggregate dynamics, for a given set of parameter values,
the aggregate number of vacancies and unemployed workers is constant. Therefore, we
cannot use time-series variation in vacancies and the job finding rate to identify the
meeting function elasticity. The selected value of 0.5 is in line with estimates of the
aggregate matching function in the U.S. reported in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
The bargaining parameter β is set equal to 0.25. It is well known that without worker-
firm matched data identification of this parameter is extremely difficult. Initially we
calibrated β to 0.5. We experimented with alternative values and found that a lower
value, 0.25, substantially improves the fit of the value-added moments. This calibration is
consistent with Flinn (2006), which has the same wage-setting mechanism for unemployed
workers and finds estimates of workers’ bargaining power between 0.34 and 0.44. Since we
estimate the model on a sample of young workers, a slightly lower value of the bargaining
parameter seems plausible.
The match production function is a key object in our model, as it regulates the degree
of production complementarities and, by extension, the degree of assortative matching
in the model. Since our model does not describe individual wage dynamics, to achieve
identification of production complementarities (parametrically or not) we need reliable
firm-level data that can be matched to individual-level data. Lacking the necessary data,
we calibrate the degree of production complementarities. Specifically, we assume the
in our data set are less precisely estimated compared to other moments, an optimal weighting matrix
gives much more weight to wage moments. As a result, the fit of other moments (namely transitions from
unemployment to job), which we consider equally important from an economic point of view, is quite poor
using the optimal weighting matrix. In addition, when moment conditions are based on relatively few
observations (as is the case in our estimation) it has been shown that equally-weighted distance matrices
can perform better than optimally-weighted ones (see Altonji and Segal (1996)).
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following match production function:
fi(h, x) = exp{µ+ s1[i=2] + σhΦ−1(h) + σxΦ−1(x)} (16)
∀h > 0, x > 0 and fi(0, x) = fi(h, 0) = 0, ∀h, x.
According to equation (16), production depends on the worker’s skill and race and
on the firm’s technology. The transformations of the worker’s and the firm’s ranks (re-
spectively exp{σhΦ−1(h)} and exp{σxΦ−1(x)}) are equivalent to assuming that both skill
and technology levels are log-normally distributed with parameters zero and σh and σx,
respectively. The level of output is regulated by the parameter µ. The match production
function depends on the worker’s race through s, which is the proportional difference in
output between equivalently ranked white and black workers.
Having calibrated and specified the model, the vector of parameters to be estimated
is the following:
θ = {λ, δ, pi, d, s, µ, σh, σx, b, κ} .
4.2 Moments
To estimate θ we select moments that are informative about the value of certain parame-
ters and for which we have reliable empirical counterparts. Due to the complexity of the
model, we can only provide an heuristic argument to support parameter identification.
4.2.1 Labor Market Transitions
Our model predicts three different rates of transition across labor market states. We
summarize the information about transitions in the model in three moments: the average
transition rate from job to unemployment (JTU hereafter) for all employed workers and
the average transition rates from unemployment to job (UTJs hereafter) for white and
black individuals. The theoretical moments are given by the following equations:
JTU =1− e−δ, (17)
UTJi =
∫ 1− exp
−λW ∑
j={P,N}
∫
αji (h, x)
vj (x)
vP + vN
dx
 ui (h)
ui
dh. (18)
In our model, JTU is exclusively governed by δ, the parameter of the continuous-time
Poisson process that determines when a match is destroyed. This implies a common
JTU across the two races, which we know is at odds with the data. In the U.S. labor
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market black workers experience, on average, shorter employment spells compared to
white workers. In the presentation of our model, we assume away racial differences in
δ because it affects sorting patterns. Since our model does not generate endogenous
differences in JTUs as a result of employer discrimination and/or skill differences, in our
baseline specification we ignore this source of heterogeneity and quantify the sources of
heterogeneity captured by the model. In section 4 we report and discuss results obtained
by fitting race-specific JTUs observed in our data set.
The UTJs for white and black workers are informative about the Poisson process
governing the meeting of workers and jobs. This can be clearly seen in equation (18),
where λW = λ(u1 + u2)
−0.5(vP + vN)0.5. This expression also shows that the difference in
UTJs across the two races is informative about employer prejudice (pi and d). Recall that
both parameters affect differently the matching rates of workers of different races, via the
matching sets, αji (h, x).
25 The matching sets also depend on workers’ skill (h), so race-
specific UTJs depend on the skill distributions of black and white workers. While we can
be sure that skill differences across races and prejudice impact UTJs, we are less certain
about their impact being sufficiently different to ensure separate parameter identification.
We will return to this point in the next subsection.
4.2.2 Distribution of Wages and Value-added
The wages paid to workers of different skill and race are a key equilibrium object of the
model. As can be clearly seen in the wage equation (equation (7)), the distribution of
wages is informative about the distributions of workers’ skill, the psychic cost of prejudice
d and the technology distribution of firms. Wages also depend on reservation values
and so they are also affected by the share of prejudiced firms (pi) and the flow value of
unemployment (b). To disentangle the skill distribution of black and white individuals,
employer prejudice parameters and the flow value of unemployment, we use the first four
moments of the wage distributions of black and white workers.
In a model similar to ours, Flabbi (2010) illustrates how the shape of the wage dis-
tribution of the minority group (females in his application) is differently affected by skill
differences and prejudice parameters. Specifically, he shows that, when all employers are
prejudiced, the mass near the reservation value is much lower compared to the wage dis-
tribution that results when both prejudice parameters are set to zero. This is because
matches with prejudiced employers are not viable for very low levels of productivity.
When pi is a number between zero and one, the wage distribution of the minority group is
a mixture of the wage distributions in prejudiced and nonprejudiced employers. He also
25See Section 6 for an illustration of these effects.
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demonstrates that pi and d affect the shape of the minority’s wage distribution differently.
While pi mainly affects the central tendency of the distribution, d flattens the distribution
to the left of the mode.
Due to the extra channels present in our model (sorting on skill and reverse discrim-
ination), it is not straightforward to verify the validity of Flabbi (2010)’s identification
argument in our model. However, when we simulate the model varying one parameter at
a time we do verify that, locally, different parameters distort the wage distributions of
blacks and whites differently. This is why, in addition to the mean and standard deviation,
we target the third and fourth moments of both wage distributions.
To disentangle the contribution of workers’ and firms’ skill to the level of wages we
make use of firm-level information. Specifically, we use the first two moments of the
distribution of value-added. While not a direct counterpart to the distribution of firms’
technology, the distribution of value-added per worker is informative about the level and
variance of firms’ technology.26
An important feature of our identification strategy is to target simultaneously race-
specific wage distribution moments and UTJs. We find that a model of skill differences
alone is not able to generate the magnitude of cross-racial differences in UTJs observed
in the data. While the differences in the UTJs help us separately identify prejudice from
differences in skill, it is less clear how we separately identify the two prejudice parameters
(pi and d). To reassure ourselves, we conduct a numerical analysis and find that the
minimization criterion is well behaved and convex in pi and d. We report the main results
of this numerical analysis in E.
4.2.3 Labor Market Tightness
The ratio of vacant jobs to unemployed workers, Θ = V
U
, summarizes the degree of tight-
ness in the labor market. We use this moment to pin down the aggregate number of firms
G and, by extension, the sunk cost of posting vacancy κ.27 Integration of equation (14)
over the support of jobs’ and workers’ skill yields the following aggregate stock-accounting
equation: G − V = 1 − U , where V denotes the aggregate number of vacancies and U
aggregate unemployment. With simple algebraic manipulations we arrive at an expression
that relates market tightness to the other aggregate stocks, namely Θ = G−1+U
U
. Hence,
given a value of U , market tightness pins down G. Conditional on the estimated parame-
26We interpret firms’ value-added per worker as the counterpart of the match production fi(h, x). We
do so because, when there is sorting on skill, firm value-added can no longer be taken as a direct measure
of firms’ technology.
27In our estimation protocol, we treat G as a parameter to be estimated. See section C for further
details on our estimation protocol.
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ters, we can use the free-entry condition (equation (5)) to compute the fixed sunk cost of
posting a vacancy κ.
5 Estimation Results
In this section we describe the empirical moments that we target in our estimation, eval-
uate the fit of alternative specifications of the model and comment on different sets of
parameter estimates.
5.1 Empirical moments
Table 2 reports empirical moments in Columns 4 and 9, respectively for the NC and SC
samples (panels A. and B.) Their bootstrapped standard deviations, reported in paren-
theses, are obtained by resampling the data 200 times.
The first three rows of each column show the empirical moments that govern worker
mobility to and from unemployment. The first two moments are the UTJs respectively
white and black males in the sample. The third moment is the JTU of all individuals
in the sample. The observed difference in UTJs of whites and blacks is 15.9 percentage
points (pp) for NC and 20.2 pp for SC. The size of these differences is consistent with
an average duration of unemployment for blacks that is 20 - 30% longer than that of
whites, and which is reported in various studies cited in Lang and Lehmann (2012). The
JTUs are 4.2 and 1.9% for the NC and SC samples, respectively. Interestingly, the higher
unemployment rates for those with no college education are driven exclusively by shorter
employment durations.
The middle rows of each panel present the first four moments of the distributions
of log-wages of black and white workers in each of the two samples. The difference in
mean wages of black and white workers is 7 and 18 log points (lp) for the NC and SC
samples, respectively. Given the selected nature of our sample, our numbers are not
directly comparable to those reported in other studies. Still, they are in the same ball-
park as those cited by Lang and Lehmann (2012).28 The much lower wage gap among
those with no college education is somewhat surprising.29 The remaining moments show
similar cross-racial patterns in both the NC and SC samples. The standard deviation of
28Lang and Lehmann (2012) argue that 10% is a plausible number for the mean wage gap among men,
after controlling for other factors.
29The fact that mean wage and UTJ gaps are higher for more educated workers does not contradict
the motivating facts of the paper: that wage and employment gaps are lower for high-skill workers. Lang
and Lehmann (2012) review facts based on what they take to be a proxy measure of cognitive ability:
the test scores of the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). Since AFQT scores are not available in
the CPS, we cannot verify these facts in our data set. However, we do find that quantile wage gaps are
lower at the top of the wage distribution in each of the two sub-samples.
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wages is higher among whites, whereas skewnesses (both positive) and kurtoses are higher
among blacks.
The bottom rows display the mean and standard deviation of the distribution of log-
value-added of the 6-digit manufacturing industries in the sample.30 The last moment used
in the estimation is the average labor market tightness (the ratio of aggregate vacancies to
aggregate unemployment) in the manufacturing sector during the sample period. Finally,
to compare the overall fit across specifications, the last row of Table 2 reports the minimum
criterion for each model (i.e. LN(θ
∗)).
5.2 Fit of the Model
Table 2 also reports simulated moments for the NC and SC samples. In each panel the
first three columns report the set of simulated moments corresponding to three alternative
model specifications. The first specification (Columns 1 and 6) assumes black and white
workers draw their skill levels from a common distribution, so that differences in labor
market outcomes are the result of employer prejudice alone (‘Discrimination’). In the
next specification (Columns 2 and 7) we assume there are no prejudiced employers in
the economy and therefore shut down the effect of hiring and wage discrimination on
workers’ labor market outcomes (‘Skills’). The last specification allows for both skill
differences and discrimination to govern workers’ labor market outcomes. This is our
preferred specification and is displayed in Columns 3 and 8. We will also refer to this
specification as the benchmark model (‘Benchmark’).
We focus on the NC sample results first. Comparing the values across columns in the
two first rows of Table 2 indicates all models fit the UTJs reasonably well. The benchmark
model matches the UTJs levels of blacks and whites more closely, but overshoots the
observed UTJ racial gap by 1.9 pp (17.8 vs 15.9 pp). The model with skill differences
only produces a considerably lower gap (11.9 pp) and the model with discrimination only
generates a considerably greater gap (18.9 pp).
Overall, the fit of wage distribution moments is not as good. ‘Discrimination’ and
‘Benchmark’ match the mean wages of blacks very well, but overshoot whites’ mean wages.
All specifications produce a substantially greater wage gap compared to the observed
one (7 lp). ‘Skills’ and ‘Discrimination’ generate a gap of 10 lp, while the benchmark
model delivers a mean wage gap of 14 lp. However, ‘Benchmark’ fits the second and
30We use the same value-added moments for both NC and SC samples. Alternatively, we could match
workers and firms based on their 4-digit industry code and obtain a different set of moments for both sub-
samples. In theory, this could be informative about different sorting patterns across the two samples. In
practice, we find that using 4-digit industry codes (as opposed to 6-digit) substantially reduces firm-level
dispersion.
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third moments of both wage distributions better. ‘Discrimination’ generates a standard
deviation for whites wages that is too low, whereas ‘Skills’ substantially overpredicts the
skewness of blacks’ wage distribution.
In sum, ‘Discrimination’ and ‘Benchmark’ perform very similarly. Allowing for differ-
ences in skills improves the fit of the UTJs and wage skewnesses of both races, as well
as the standard deviation of wages of blacks, but at the cost of a poorer fit of the racial
wage gap.
Turning to the SC sample, it is noticeable that the qualitative performance of the
various specifications changes somewhat. As we argue in more detail below, this is related
to the differences in mean wage levels and UTJs across the two samples. ‘Discrimination’
still overpredicts the racial UTJ gap, but targets the mean wage gap more closely. The
predicted levels of mean wages are, however, considerably below their empirical targets,
the standard deviations of wages too high and the skewness of blacks’ wages too low. On
the other hand, ‘Skills’ and ‘Benchmark’ hit the levels of both UTJs quite well, but at the
cost of overpredicting the wage gap compared to the data. This very large gap is mostly
due to the poor fit of blacks’ mean wages.
In conclusion, although all specifications match quite well important subsets of mo-
ments, our preferred specification comes closer to capturing simultaneously all the key
aspects of the data: the difference in UTJs of whites and blacks and the moments of
blacks’ and whites’ log-wage distributions. This information is summarized in the value
of the minimization criterion at the bottom of Table 2, which is lower for the benchmark
model (0.025 and 0.046) compared to ‘Discrimination’ (0.027 and 0.118) and ‘Skills’ (0.052
and 0.049), respectively for the NC and SC samples.
5.3 Structural Parameter Estimates
Having argued that our model does a good job at matching the empirical moments, we now
analyze its economic content. Table 3 reports the parameter estimates of all specifications
for both the NC and SC samples, with standard errors reported in parentheses.
The estimated monthly probabilities of job arrival are 69% and 66%, respectively for
the NC and SC samples.31 A comparison with the UTJs in Table 2 suggests that, for the
NC group, approximately a quarter of all job offers are rejected, while a third of offers
are rejected by those with some college education. The corresponding job finding rates
(UTJs) are not too dissimilar, indicating that the large employment differentials between
the two strata are governed by very different separation rates (δ).
In terms of the relative importance of discrimination and skill differences in explaining
31Calculated as 1− e−λW .
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Table 3: Parameter Estimates
A. No college B. Some college
Discrim Skills Bench. Discrim Skills Bench.
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
pi .619 .565 .879 .311
(.074) (.112) (.410) (.039)
d 6.75 7.37 4.90 1.41
(1.438) (1.29) (.52) (.262)
s -.048 -.014 -.143 -.136
(.008) (.001) (.021) (.040)
λ 1.19 1.24 1.17 1.91 1.16 1.07
(.428) (.076) (.116) (.194) (.057) (.030)
δ .043 .042 .043 .020 .021 .021
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
µ 3.83 3.63 3.85 3.88 4.32 4.32
(.104) (.039) (.056) (.209) (.184) (.110)
σh .101 .141 .101 .151 .129 .124
(.008) (.006) (.007) (.032) (.019) (.019)
σx .568 .445 .572 .418 .500 .506
(.039) (.027) (.038) (.061) (.031) (.051)
b 7.02 8.07 6.99 5.71 6.89 6.68
(1.309) (.417) (.722) (1.09) (.98) (1.50)
G .959 .959 .959 .979 .976 .976
(.040) (.004) (.024) (.045) (.023) (.028)
Notes.—Estimation by SMM of the three specifications. Asymptotic standard errors reported
in parentheses.
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differences in labor market outcomes, we obtain very distinct patterns in the two samples.
In the NC sample, there is evidence of strong and widespread employer prejudice against
black workers. The loss of utility incurred by a prejudiced employer when matching with a
black worker is estimated at $7.4 per hour. The share of prejudiced employers is estimated
at 56.5%. The estimated average differences in skill across black and white individuals
are very small (a mean black-white skill differential of 1.4%). On the other hand, in the
SC sample we find evidence of very a substantial skill gap across races (13.6%), as well as
mild employer prejudice concentrated among a small share of employers (the utility cost
of employing a black worker is $1.4 and the share of prejudiced employers is 31.1%).
The large differences across strata in terms of the racial skill gap may reflect the differ-
ences in skill heterogeneity across the two samples. For a given stratum, the distribution
of output depends on the worker’s race and skill, as well as firms’ productivity. Condi-
tioning on the firm being of median type, we can express the mean and variance of output
as a function of µ, σh and s.
32 Inserting our estimated values of µ, σh and s in that
expression, for an employed worker in the median firm, the variance of output is 4 (3)
times larger for a white (black) with some college education compared to a white (black)
without any college education.
5.4 Heterogeneous job-destruction rates
Up until this point we have estimated the model under the assumption that both types of
workers are exposed to the same exogenous job destruction rate. In this section we relax
that assumption and estimate a version of the model where job destruction arrival rates
are allowed to vary across races by fitting the observed racial-specific JTUs.33 For sake
of space, we report the main tables of results in F. In terms of differences across the two
samples, the cross-racial difference in JTUs is higher among individuals with some college
vs no college. In the NC sample blacks’ JTU is 0.072 vs. 0.039 for whites, whereas those
figures are 0.044 and 0.017 in the SC sample. Overall, the estimation results are consistent
with those obtained using a common job destruction rate across races: employer prejudice
fits the main patterns in the NC sample, whereas skill differences match the SC sample
moments.
The main effect of introducing different job destruction rates is to introduce an ex-
ogenous wage gap and a negative UTJ gap in the absence of either employer prejudice
32fi(h, 0.5) = exp{µ + s1[i=2] + σhΦ−1(h)}. Since h is uniformly distributed, taking the variance
operator through this yields var{fi(h, 0.5)} = exp{2µ + 2s1[i=2]}.var{σhΦ−1(h)} = exp{2µ + 2s1[i=2] +
σ2}[exp{σ2} − 1].
33A more complete route to address this issue would be to extend the model in order to generate
endogenous racial differences in JTUs as a result of prejudice and skill differences. An extension of the
model in that direction is beyond the scope of this paper.
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or skill differences. Since matches with black workers have shorter duration, the present-
discounted value of a match with a black worker is lower compared to an equally skilled
white. This translates into lower wages for feasible matches and a lower outside option
for black workers. Since the match feasibility condition (see equation (9)) only depends
on job destruction rates through the outside option (and negatively), the matching sets
of black workers expand relative to whites. As a result, blacks’ UTJ is higher compared
to whites. To summarize, the inclusion of separation rates that vary by race does not
significantly change our parameter estimates and model fit.
5.5 Taking Stock
The fact that, based on the same model, we obtain very different interpretations of facts
that are qualitatively similar (compared to whites, blacks have lower UTJ, average and
standard deviations of wages but higher wage skewness) suggests the performance of the
two polar specifications is affected by the levels of UTJs and mean wages. To generate em-
pirically reasonable UTJ gaps, the model based only on skill differences needs to generate
a substantial wage gap. On the other hand, the model based only on prejudice matches
the wage and UTJ gaps well, but struggles to generate high mean wages for blacks and
whites.
In what concerns the empirical estimates, given that we estimated the model in a par-
ticular sample (young workers employed in the manufacturing sector) we cannot rule out
that they are specific to this segment of the labor market. The patterns of employer preju-
dice that we find in the NC sample are quite elevated. Audit studies (see e.g. Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2004)) usually find that, in quasi-experiments, observationally-equivalent
black workers receive between 15 to 30% less calls relative to whites. This could suggest
that the share of prejudiced employers is lower. However, that interpretation rests on the
assumption that prejudiced employers never call black workers and that all nonprejudiced
employers do. This is only true for special configurations of parameter values. As our
model highlights, in a more realistic environment with two-sided skill heterogeneity, some
prejudiced employers hire black workers and some nonprejudiced employers do not.
A broader perspective to interpret our empirical results should take account of the
fact that, in addition to evidence on taste-based discrimination, there is ample evidence
suggesting that statistical discrimination is an important driver of cross-racial differences
in labor market outcomes in the U.S. (see e.g. Charles and Guryan (2011)). If statistical
discrimination generates similar predictions (in terms of size and direction of employment
and wage gaps), our empirical strategy will overestimate the extent of employer prejudice.
On the contrary, if statistical discrimination predicts opposite effects, it will underestimate
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the extent of prejudice. Exploring this issue is an important avenue for future research.
6 Sorting on Race/Prejudice and Skill
Having estimated the parameters of the model in both the NC and SC samples, we
can simulate two versions of the model featuring both skill differences and employer
prejudice to provide an interpretation of the observed empirical patterns.34 By doing so,
a clear relationship emerges between matching decisions (captured by matching sets) and
differences in labor market outcomes for workers of different races. To simulate the model
we follow the methodology described in C, where the model is specified as detailed in
Section 4.1.
6.1 No College sample
We start by describing the patterns of the model based on the NC sample. The two
plots in the top panel of Figure 1 display the equilibrium strategies of all the agents in
the economy (their matching sets). Figures 1a and 1b plot the contour lines of the set
of matching sets of respectively prejudiced and nonprejudiced employers with white and
black workers. Workers’ skill (expressed in percentiles of the population distribution) is
displayed on the horizontal axis and firms’ technology (expressed in percentiles of the
population distribution) on the vertical axis. The solid/dashed lines indicate the bounds
of the set of matching sets with white/black workers. The region in the interior of each
of the two pairs of lines contain all matches that produce a positive surplus.
A first observation is that the shapes of the two sets of matching sets embody sorting on
skill: low(high)-technology firms match more often with low(high)-skill workers. Matches
in the northwestern corner generate negative surpluses: high-technology firms have a
high outside option that can only be compensated when they meet high-skill workers and
production is high. Conversely, in the southeastern corner, the outside option of high-skill
workers can only be outweighed when they match with high-technology firms.
A second observation concerns differences in whites’ and blacks’ sets of matching sets.
Clearly, if there were no prejudice (d = 0) the two sets of matching sets would coincide.
But, as can be seen by inspecting Figure 1a, the set of matching sets of blacks with
prejudiced firms is contained in the one of whites. It implies that there is a range of
technology levels for which prejudiced firms are willing to match with white workers,
but not with equally skilled black workers. This is an instance of hiring discrimination
34To simplify the description of main effects, we focus on a specification of the model with a common
δ. All arguments that follow can be made, albeit with an additional moving part, with a model with
separation rates dependent on race
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Figure 1: Simulation of Baseline Model — No College sample
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(b) Matching Sets of Nonprejudiced Firms
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stated in Corollary 2. The main mechanism underlying the difference in the two sets of
matching sets is the direct effect of prejudice. It decreases the value of matches between
black workers and prejudiced firms, to the point that even if when they are paid a lower
wage compared to an equally able white worker (wage discrimination), some matches do
not generate a positive surplus. This decrease in the set of matching sets is asymmetric
with respect to blacks’ skill: it is much stronger in the southwestern corner and milder in
the northeastern corner. This follows from the way we modeled discrimination, where the
psychic cost for a prejudiced employer upon matching with a black worker is independent
of workers’ and firms’ skill levels. This implies low-skill blacks — who due to sorting
match with low-technology firms — suffer relatively more from prejudice compared to
their high-skill counterparts.
A different mechanism underlies reverse hiring discrimination (see Corollary 3). As
can be seen in Figure 1b, the set of matching sets of black workers is larger than that
of white workers in the northwestern and southeastern corners. There is an interval of
technology levels for which nonprejudiced firms are willing to match with black workers
but not with equally skilled white workers. The presence of prejudiced employers decreases
blacks’ opportunities in the labor market, which results in them having a lower outside
option compared to equally skilled whites (see Proposition 1). This lower outside option
makes matches of nonprejudiced employers of certain technology levels with blacks feasible
compared to unfeasible matches with equally skilled whites.
The differences in labor market outcomes between black and white workers of similar
skill depend on the relative magnitude of the various forms of discrimination present in
the model, which in turn are determined by pi and d and the share of whites and blacks
in the population, m and (1 − m). In both Figures 1c and 1d the solid lines indicate
white workers’ outcomes and the dashed lines the outcomes of black workers, whereas
the x-axis denotes the skill percentiles of the population of all workers. Figure 1c shows
the unemployment rates of both types of workers for different levels of skill. More skilled
workers experience lower unemployment rates. For both types of workers the distributions
of unemployment rates across levels of skill describe a U-shaped curve: unemployment
rates decrease up until percentile 40 and increase from there on for whites and remain
flat for blacks. This effect follows from the shape of matching sets (wider in the middle of
the skill distribution) and is a general feature of other search and matching models with
sorting on skill (see Eeckhout and Kircher (2011)). A more important feature of this plot
is that, whatever the level of skill of black workers, they experience higher unemployment
rates compared to equally skilled white workers. This highlights what is already apparent
in Figures 1a and 1b: that hiring discrimination dominates reverse hiring discrimination.
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This pictures also highlights that the black-white unemployment rate differential is far
higher for low levels of skill and becomes smaller as the level of skill increases, consistent
with a disproportionate effect of the psychic cost d on low-skill black workers’ matching
opportunities.
Figure 1d displays the differences in expected wages for blacks and whites with different
levels of skill. Expected wages are increasing in workers’ skill. As can be seen more clearly
in Figure 1e, the black-white expected wage differential displays a non-linear relationship
in workers’ skill: the gap increases up until percentile 70 and decreases thereafter. This
pattern can be explained by changing relative importance of two distinct channels. The
first channel is sorting by skill. Until percentile 60 (see Figure 1a) black workers are
only employed by nonprejudiced employers, so the profile of racial differences in expected
wages along the skill distribution in this region is not affected by direct discrimination
(since d does not enter blacks’ wages in this region). Hence, it must be explained by
changing patterns of skill sorting among blacks and whites as workers’ skill increases.
Figure 1b displays the racial gap in the average technology level of firms with whom
workers are matched for different skill levels. From percentile 0 to 20, the average technol-
ogy of firms with whom blacks are matched is higher (hence the negative gap) and rises
faster compared to whites’ as skill increases (this can be seen in the steeper slope of the
dashed line vs the solid line in Figure 1b). Therefore, the only reason why the wages of
whites are increasing faster than those of blacks in this region is because whites’ outside
options are also increasing. From percentile 20 to 60 the expected firm technology with
whom whites are matched improves relative to blacks’ and that drives the increase in
the wage gap (see bottom lines of Figure 1b). From percentile 60, blacks start matching
with high-technology prejudiced firms (see Figure 1a). As a result, the effect of direct
discrimination also sets in, so that, as the skill of workers increases, the wage gap also
decreases. This is because −βd represents an ever decreasing proportion of wages (see
equation (7)). In this region blacks reduce their average firm technology gap relative to
whites as their skill increases, but that effect is quantitatively smaller.
6.2 Some College sample
Figure 2 displays various labor market outcomes for the model estimated on the SC sam-
ple. Since many of the points we made regarding the NC results are also present in the
SC results, we focus on the main differences between them. This segment of the labor
market is characterized by mild prejudice concentrated among a small share of employers,
and large skill differences across workers of different races. The lower level of prejudice
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translates into small differences in matching sets across races.35 The degree of hiring
discrimination is much smaller (see 2a), and there is almost no reverse hiring discrimina-
tion (see Figure 2b). Consequently, the differences in expected wages and unemployment
across workers with the same level of skill are much lower (see Figures 2c and 2d). In
addition, the milder differences in matching sets generate smoother patterns of wage and
unemployment gaps along workers’ skill. Both the unemployment rate gap and the ex-
pected wage gap decrease monotonically as the worker’s skill increases (see Figures 2e and
2f).
7 Counterfactual Policy Analysis
In this section we use the estimated model to perform counterfactual experiments aimed
at evaluating the effect of two policy approaches in reducing differences in labor market
outcomes of blacks relative to whites. Beyond labor market outcomes, we are interested in
quantifying th effects of policies on individual and social welfare. We measure individuals’
welfare by their expected present discounted lifetime utility value as described by the
equation below:
oi(h) = ui(h)Ui(h) +
∑
j={N,P}
∫
γji (h, x)W
j
i (h, x)dx. (19)
Because we focus on the effects of policies in equilibria satisfying the free-entry condi-
tion (by which employers make zero profits in expectation), we only compare the effects
of policies on workers’ welfare.36 However, for descriptive purposes it is useful to define
the welfare of firms by the expected present discounted lifetime utility value, as in the
equation below:
oj(x) = vj(x)V j(x) +
∑
i={1,2}
∫
γji (h, x)J
j
i (h, x)dh. (20)
To evaluate the social desirability of different policies, we use a utilitarian social welfare
function given by the sum of workers’ welfare.37 An important caveat to the conclusions
35Due to the large estimated differences in skill distributions across races, there are no blacks with very
high levels of skill, nor whites with very low levels of skill. This is why the supports of the dashed and
solid lines do not overlap at their extremes.
36In describing the effects of the policies, it is often convenient to refer to the short-run equilibrium,
i.e. without satisfying the free-entry condition. For sake of space we do not report those results in the
paper, but they are available from the authors on request.
37Our chosen social welfare function includes the losses due to prejudice. In our view, excluding them
would make sense if the social cost of prejudice were fully internalized by prejudiced employers. In our
baseline model that is not the case – the utility cost of prejudice is partly transferred from prejudiced
employers to black workers–, so it is important to include those losses.
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Figure 2: Simulation of Baseline Model — Some College sample
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(b) Matching Sets of Nonprejudiced Firms
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(c) Unemployment Rates
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on the effect of the policies on social welfare is that we do not consider the costs of
implementing the policies.
We consider two policies in our counterfactual analysis. The first policy is an illus-
tration of an increase in the enforceability of the equal-pay principle (a pillar of anti-
discrimination legislation). The second policy entails an increase in the premarket skills
of black workers.38
To describe the effects of the two policies, we simulate the modified version of the
model for the two sets of parameter values estimated respectively on the NC and SC
samples. Table 4 reports statistics on workers’ and firms’ labor market outcomes, as
well as on group and social welfare, for the baseline and the two counterfactual policy
equilibria, for each of the two samples. The top panel displays average log-wages and
unemployment rates for both worker types. The middle panel reports the mean vacancy
rate of prejudiced and nonprejudiced firms, as well as the total number of active firms
(G). The bottom panel provides information on social welfare, the welfare of the two
worker types and the welfare accounted for by production and the utility losses due to
prejudice.
7.1 Equal pay
In the context of our model, the principle of equal pay implies that equally skilled workers
working in equally productive firms should be paid the same wage. In our baseline spec-
ification, we assume that workers and employers may agree wages that explicitly violate
this principle. We believe this is a plausible description, insofar as worker skill and job
requirements are imperfectly observed by parties external to a match, thereby making the
enforcement of equal-pay legislation very difficult in practice. Against this backdrop, we
consider a policy that improves the application of the equal-pay principle across workers
of similar skill and different races. Specifically, we consider a setup in which the utility
cost of prejudice is not transferable from prejudiced employers to black workers. Recall
that, in the baseline model, when a black worker and a prejudiced firm negotiate the
wage, the utility cost of prejudice enters the negotiation explicitly. Both parties recognize
the presence of this cost and its negative effect on the utility value of the match, and
they agree to share that loss according to their rent-sharing parameters. In this counter-
factual experiment, the utility cost of prejudice is fully internalized by the employer. To
specify it, we change the match feasibility condition between black workers (type-2) and
38It would be interesting to structurally evaluate the effects of minority quotas, i.e. policies that in-
centivize firms to hire a certain proportion of minority workers (see Miller (forthcoming) for a recent
reduced-form analysis). In our model a firm is one job, so the notion of quota (a share of firms’ employ-
ment) is not well defined.
35
prejudiced firms (type-P) from equation (9) to equation (21),
αji (h, x) = 1
{
(1− β)[fi(h, x)− ρUi(h)− ρV j(x)] > d1[(i,j)=(2,P )]
}
. (21)
This condition states that a prejudiced employer will only match with a black worker
if its flow surplus is greater than the psychic cost d. In addition to the match feasibility
condition, we also change the payoffs of black workers and prejudiced employers when
they are involved in matches with each other. Now prejudiced firms fully internalize the
psychic cost of prejudice and so none of it is transferred to black workers’ wages.39 It is
important to note that, due to the structure of our model – one in which wages depend
explicitly on outside options and search frictions are random–, full equal pay would only
be enforced if all prejudiced firms were driven out of the market. Therefore, the aim of
the policy is to limit wage discrimination against black workers. In the baseline model
wage discrimination occurs via two channels: the direct effect of d on wages and its effect
through the outside option. In this counterfactual the first form of wage discrimination
cannot occur, but the latter remains operative. In this sense, we see this counterfactual
as an illustration of the impact of policy instruments that limit the ability of prejudiced
employers to pay lower wages to equally skilled black workers.
To describe the effects of enforcing equal pay we compare the values in columns (1) and
(2) with those in columns (4) and (5) of Table 4, respectively for the NC and SC samples.
The main direct effect of equal pay is to reduce the market returns of prejudiced employers
via two channels: the number of feasible matches with black workers diminishes and the
wages paid in feasible matches increase. This leads to an increase in the unemployment
rate of black workers, along with an increase in their average wages. In the short run (i.e.
keeping number of active firms constant), the lower outside option of prejudiced firms
benefits white workers: their average unemployment rate is lower and their average wage
higher. In the long run, however, the lower expected returns of firm entry lead to net firm
exit, which overturns the benefits to white workers. Overall, the average unemployment
rates of whites increase slightly relative to the baseline economy, while average wages
decrease very slightly. The combined effect of the policy on cross-race differences in labor
market outcomes is a reduction in the wage gap, but which comes at the cost of a higher
unemployment gap. Put together, the latter lead to a reduction in the welfare gap across
races (of less than one percentage point, from 15.12 to 14.34% in the NC sample, and from
39.76 to 39.27 in the SC sample). The policy leads to a very minor reduction in social
welfare. The gains to black workers come at the cost of lower welfare to white workers,
which is the result of a reduction in the number of active firms. The lower number of
39See G for a full mathematical description of this specification.
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active firms leads to less matches being realized and, consequently, to lower output. This
effect is partially mitigated by more efficient labor market sorting: the contraction in the
set of matching sets between prejudiced firms and black workers improves the productivity
of realized matches and diminishes the welfare losses due to prejudice.
While the the aggregate effects of equal pay are similar in the two samples, the dis-
tributional effects are somewhat different. In the NC sample’s baseline economy, only
very high-skill black workers match with nonprejudiced firms, so the direct policy effects
will be concentrated on them. For these workers, the contraction in matching sets (see
Figure 3a) leads to higher unemployment rates, but also much higher wages in feasible
matches. This increase in expected wages leads to an increase in the outside option of
high-skill black workers, implying that some matches with low-technology nonprejudiced
firms are no longer feasible (see Figure 3b). As illustrated in Figures 3c and 3d, the
changes in the unemployment rate and wage gaps are concentrated on the right tail of
the skill distribution. Figure 3e highlights that the welfare gains to black workers are
similarly concentrated on the right tail of the skill distribution. Figure 3f makes the same
point by highlighting that the fall in firms lifetime values falls mostly on high-technology
prejudiced firms. On the contrary, whites’ welfare losses are evenly distributed along the
skill distribution.
The distributional effects on the SC sample are illustrated in Figure 4. In the SC sam-
ple’s baseline economy, there are feasible matches between black workers and prejudiced
firms in the whole support of the skill distribution. The effect of equal pay is to contract
the set of matching sets towards the 45◦ line. This contraction is particularly strong in
the left tail of the skill distribution. This effect is so large that the wage gap increases
in this part of the distribution, whereas it decreases everywhere else. Whereas almost all
white workers are made worse off by the policy, blacks on the 40 percentile of the skill
distribution or above benefit from the policy (those below are worse off).
7.2 Equal skill
To illustrate the impacts of policies aiming to equalize the pre-market skills of minority and
majority workers, we conduct a counterfactual experiment whereby the skill distribution
of black workers is set equal to that of whites. We interpret the measure of skill in our
model as general one, i.e. it can relate both to cognitive or noncognitive skills. This
counterfactual can speak to a wide variety of real-world policy interventions aimed at
closing the racial skill gap (see Fryer Jr (2011) for a comprehensive account of such
interventions).
In Table 4, Columns (3) and (6) report the outcomes of the estimated model with s set
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Figure 3: Equal Pay – No College sample
(a) Matches of Prejudiced Firms and Blacks
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Figure 4: Equal Pay – Some College sample
(a) Matches of Prejudiced Firms and Blacks
Worker Skill (population percentiles)
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to zero; which we compare to the values in Columns (1) and (2) pertaining to the baseline
equilibrium. Black workers are now more skilled, so they match, on average, with firms
with higher technology. This produces a positive effect on their wages via an outside
option effect. Moreover, wages further increase as the productivity of black workers is
higher. In the short run, the increase in blacks’ skill entails an increase in the competition
for jobs across workers, which depresses whites’ matching opportunities and wages (via
an outside option effect). However, since a more skilled labor force pushes firms’ expected
returns upwards, in the long run the mass of active firms increases, thereby overturning
the negative effects on whites’ wages. Social welfare is obviously greater under equal skill.
This increase in driven both by a higher number of matched agents and a greater average
production per match. The social losses due to prejudice are greater, but this is due to
the higher number of matches between blacks and prejudiced firms.
The distributional effects of the policy are qualitatively similar, but the policy achieves
a much greater reduction in the welfare gap across races in the SC sample. This is entirely
justified by the much larger gap in average skills across races in the baseline SC sample
vs the NC sample. Unsurprisingly, leveling the skill distributions of the two races in the
SC sample entails a much larger shock to the economy. In both samples whites benefit
from a more skilled labor force via increased firm entry.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we develop a search and matching model of the labor market with two-
dimensional heterogeneous firms and workers to replicate key stylized facts pertaining to
racial discrimination in the U.S. labor market. The model replicates facts regarding mean
differences in wages and unemployment rates between white and black workers, as well as
across their respective skill levels. We estimate the model using publicly available data for
the U.S. manufacturing sector, and show that it captures well empirical moments retrieved
from different data sources and pertaining to different aspects of the labor market.
We used the estimated model to characterize the equilibrium allocation of workers to
jobs in a frictional environment in which workers differ in terms of a nonproductive at-
tribute as well as skill, and where jobs have different technology levels and are operated by
employers with different racial attitudes. The equilibrium allocation is characterized by
positive assortative matching and wage and hiring discrimination, where these two chan-
nels operate with more intensity among low-skill workers compared to high-skill workers.
Our estimation results portray employer prejudice in the U.S. manufacturing sector
as strong and widespread among workers without college education, and concentrated
41
and mild among workers with some college education or more. Given the incomplete
and partial nature of our model, we are obviously cautious in taking our estimates as a
definitive description of employer prejudice in the U.S. There is ample room to enrich our
modeling approach along important dimensions, including trying to match other relevant
empirical moments, and thereby obtain more credible estimates. In addition to including
on-the-job search, it seems important to allow for endogenous job destruction, so that
employer prejudice and skill differences are allowed to explain differences in separation
rates across races. Another important limitation of our work is that we take the skill
distribution of workers as given. In reality, skill acquisition is likely to be affected by the
degree of labor market discrimination. Any of those extensions adds significant complexity
to the model and the estimation protocol, and so we leave that effort for future research.
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Appendix
A Proofs of theoretical results
In all the proofs presented in this section we assume the production function fi(h, x)
satisfies the regularity conditions stated in assumption A0 in Shimer and Smith (2000)
and strict supermodularity. Formally, we have that:
Assumption 1 (Production Function): The production function fi(h, x) is nonneg-
ative, symmetric, continuous, and twice differentiable, with uniformly bounded first partial
derivatives on [0, 1]2. The production function fi(h, x) is strictly supermodular.
Proof of Proposition 1. Outside Option Effects
Part 1 of Lemma 1 in Shimer and Smith (2000) states that, for any worker of any skill
level, her unemployment value can only be smaller if evaluated at some alternative (non-
optimal) matching set. This result applies in our environment as well.40 In particular, it
40The proof is available from the authors upon request.
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implies that, for any type-1 worker with skill h:
ρU1 (h) ≥ b+ λW
∑
j=P,N
∫
αj2 (h, x)
[
W j1 (h, x)− U1 (h)
] vj (x)
vP + vN
dx. (22)
Subtracting ρU2(h) to both sides of this inequality, substituting in the bargaining
solution (equation (8)) and rearranging one obtains the following inequality:
U1 (h)− U2 (h) ≥ d
ρ
×
λW β
ρ+δ
∫
αP2 (h, x)
vP (x)
vP+vN
dx
1 + λ
W β
ρ+δ
∑
j=P,N
∫
αj2(h, x)
vj(x)
vP+vN
dx
. (23)
If pi ∈ (0, 1) then all workers face a positive probability of meeting a prejudiced firm due
to random matching frictions, i.e. v
P (x)
vP+vN
> 0, ∀x. Since we are characterizing equilibria
in which at least some matches of every type are feasible, the integral in the numerator
is always positive and so, when d > 0, U1(h) > U2(h), ∀h.
Mutatis mutandis, one can prove that V N(x) > V P (x), ∀x.
Proof of Corollary 1. Wage Discrimination
Take an arbitrary h and x. If pi ∈ (0, 1) and d > 0, then U1(h) > U2(h), ∀h and :
wP2 (h, x) =β
[
fi(h, x)− d− ρV P (x)
]
+ (1− β) ρU2 (h) <
β
[
fi(h, x)− ρV P (x)
]
+ (1− β) ρU2 (h) < (24)
β
[
fi(h, x)− ρV P (x)
]
+ (1− β) ρU1 (h) = wP1 (h, x).
We have proven that wP1 (h, x) > w
P
2 (h, x), ∀(h, x). Mutatis mutandis, one can prove
that wN1 (h, x) > w
N
2 (h, x), ∀(h, x).
Proof of Corollary 2. Hiring Discrimination by Prejudiced Firms
Using equation (8) one can write SP1 (h, x) as a function of S
P
2 (h, x):
SP1 (h, x) = S
P
2 (h, x) +
d+ ρ(U2(h)− U1(h))
ρ+ δ
.
First, proving d + ρ(U2(h)− U1(h)) > 0 will imply SP1 (h, x) > SP2 (h, x), ∀(h, x). The
proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 1 except that we are interested in the upper
limit of the difference U1 (h)− U2 (h). Specifically,
U1 (h)− U2 (h) ≤ d
ρ
×
λW β
ρ+δ
∫
αP1 (h, x)
vP (x)
vP+vN
dx
1 + λ
W β
ρ+δ
∑
j=P,N
∫
αj1(h, x)
vj(x)
vP+vN
dx
. (25)
Using the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 1, we have U1 (h)−U2 (h) < dρ .
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Take an arbitrary (h, x) and assume that a type-2 worker will not be hired, i.e. SP2 (h, x) ≤
0. She will suffer hiring discrimination by prejudiced firms for all combinations of (h, x)
such that 0 < SP1 (h, x) <
d+ρ(U2(h)−U1(h))
ρ+δ
.
Recall that we are characterizing equilibria where some but not all matches of every
kind are feasible, which implies ∃(h, x) : SP1 (h, x) > 0 and ∃(h′, x′) : SP1 (h′, x′) ≤ 0. Part
2 of Lemma 1 in Shimer and Smith (2000) states that the values of unmatched agents
are Lipschitz and thus continuous. This result applies in our environment as well.41 In
particular, it implies that Sji (h, x) is continuous with respect to both h and x. Hence, by
the intermediate value theorem, ∃(h′′, x′′) : 0 < SP1 (h′′, x′′) =  < d+ρ(U2(h)−U1(h))ρ+δ .
We have shown that there exists at least one combination of (h′′, x′′) between a type-
1 worker and a prejudiced firm such that 0 < SP1 (h
′′, x′′) < d+ρ(U2(h)−U1(h))
ρ+δ
. Since
the support of workers’ skill is the same, SP2 (h
′′, x′′) is well-defined and we know that
SP2 (h
′′, x′′) ≤ 0, i.e. a type-2 worker of the same skill level suffers hiring discrimination
by the very same firm.
Proof of Corollary 3. Hiring Discrimination by Nonprejudiced Firms
SN2 (h, x) can be expressed as a function of S
N
1 (h, x):
SN2 (h, x) = S
N
1 (h, x) +
ρ(U1(h)− U2(h))
ρ+ δ
.
Proposition 1 implies SN2 (h, x) > S
N
1 (h, x), ∀(h, x). The rest of the proof is analogous
to the proof of Corollary 2.
B Equilibrium Definition
Definition 3 (Equilibrium): Given exogenous parameters L, m, d, pi, ρ, β, b, κ, δ,
the production function fi(h, x), a meeting function M(u1 +u2, v
P + vN) and measures of
firms and workers `i(h), g
j(x), an equilibrium is a vector
(αji (h, x), ui(h), v
j(x), Ui(h), V
j(x), G)
that solves the system of equations composed of the value functions of unmatched agents
(equations (26) and (27)), the free-entry condition (equation (5)), the measures of un-
matched agents (equations (28) and (29)) and the matching indicator functions of all the
agents participating in the economy αji (h, x) (equation (9)):
41The proof is available from the authors upon request.
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Ui(h) =
b+ λ
W β
ρ+δ
∑
j={N,P}
∫
αji (h, x)
[
fi(h, x)− d1[(i,j)=(2,P )] − ρV j(x)
] vj(x)
vP+vN
dx
ρ+ ρλ
W β
ρ+δ
∑
j={N,P}
∫
αji (h, x)
vj(x)
vP+vN
dx
, (26)
V j(x) =
λF (1−β)
ρ+δ
∑
i={1,2}
∫
αji (h, x)
[
fi(h, x)− d1[(i,j)=(2,P )] − ρUi(h)
] ui(h)
u1+u2
dh
ρ+ ρλ
F (1−β)
ρ+δ
∑
i={1,2}
∫
αji (h, x)
ui(h)
u1+u2
dh
, (27)
ui(h) =
li(h)
1 + λ
W
δ
∑
j={N,P}
∫
αji (h, x)
vj(x)
vP+vN
dx
, (28)
and
vj(x) =
gj(x)
1 + λ
F
δ
∑
i={1,2}
∫
αji (h, x)
ui(h)
u1+u2
dh
. (29)
C Simulation Algorithm
The computational burden of our estimation protocol is considerably reduced by treating
G as an exogenous parameter and backing out κ after the estimation is completed. Recall
that, conditional on values for all other parameters, equation (5) provides a one-to-one
mapping between κ and G. Using this this approach spares us from solving the free-entry
condition every time we simulate the model. Hence, to estimate the model we implement
the following simulation algorithm:
1. We set initial values for all the equilibrium objects (values, densities, matching sets
and the total number of firms in the economy) and parameters of the model. We
discretize the supports and measures of the skill distributions of workers and firms
in the economy.
2. Using the initial values we iterate over equations (26) and (27) to determine Ui(h)
and V j(x), at each stage updating the region of feasible matches determined by
equation (9).
3. New values for ui(h) and v
j(x) are obtained from equations (13) and (14).
4. Given the values determined in step 3, new values of ui, v
j and λW are determined.
5. Steps 2 through 4 are updated until the endogenous distributions ui(h) and v
j(x)
converge.
6. Once the model converges we evaluate the left-hand side of equation (5) to determine
the value of κ.
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D Asymptotic Standard Errors
LN(θ) =
1
2
(
mˆN −mS(θ)
)′
Ω−1
(
mˆN −mS(θ)
)
The solution θˆ can be solved by differentiating the criterion above, giving the first
order condition.
MS(θˆ)′Ω−1
(
mˆN −mS(θˆ)
)
= 0
MS(θˆ) is a Jacobian matrix of moment conditions with respect to the parameters.
MS(θ) =
∂
(
mˆN −mS(θ)
)
∂θ′
= −∂m
S(θ)
∂θ′
Taking a Taylor series approximation of the score condition, where θ0 is the true value of
the parameters, θ˜ is some point between the estimate θˆ and the true value and for ease of
notation M ≡MS(θ0). After, the Taylor series approximation, the subsequent lines in
the expression below impute the score condition and scale by a factor
√
N , respectively.
Also, note the N subscript has been dropped from the moment conditions, this implies
population, rather than sample moments.
0 =MS(θˆ)′Ω−1
(
mˆ−mS(θˆ)
)
≈M ′Ω−1 (mS(θ0)− mˆ)+M ′Ω−1∂
(
mˆ−mS(θ˜)
)
∂θ′
(
θˆ − θ0
)
≈M ′Ω−1 (mS(θ0)− mˆ)+M ′Ω−1M (θˆ − θ0)
√
N
(
θˆ − θ0
)
≈− (M ′Ω−1M)−1M ′Ω−1 [√N (mˆ−mS(θ0))]
Assuming normality of every element in mˆ, the above expansion shows that the pa-
rameters in θ will also be normally distributed. Given that all moments are means, subject
to some weak regularity conditions, the central limit theorem guarantees normality. Thus
to compute the asymptotic variance one needs to take the variance operator through the
above expression.
V
[√
N
(
θˆ − θ0
)]
=
=
(
M ′Ω−1M
)−1
M ′Ω−1V
[√
N
(
mˆ−mS(θ0)
)
,
√
N
(
mˆ−mS(θ0)
)′]
×Ω′−1M (M ′Ω−1M)−1
=
(
M ′Ω−1M
)−1
M ′Ω−1V
[√
Nmˆ,
√
Nmˆ
]
Ω′−1M
(
M ′Ω−1M
)−1
=
(
M ′Ω−1M
)−1
M ′Ω−1SΩ′−1M
(
M ′Ω−1M
)−1
Since the weighting matrix is specified to approximate the asymptotic standard errors
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one needs to approximate the Jacobian M and the variance-covariance matrix of the
empirical moments S. M is approximated using two sided finite differences and S is
approximated by bootstrapping the empirical moments, resampling the data 200 times. A
slight complication to the bootstrap procedure is that our data comes from three different
sources. We abstract away from this problem by bootstrapping each data source assuming
independence. Clearly some of the empirical moments coming from different sources
will depend on one another, for example the job finding rates and the market tightness.
However, we find imputing arbitrary covariances into the matrix S has little implication
on the size of the standard errors.
E Separate Identification of Prejudice Parameters
In this section we show evidence to argue that, in our estimation, pi (the proportion of
prejudice firms) and d (the level of prejudice) are separately identified. To demonstrate
this, we fix all elements of θ to the values that minimize the criterion in Table 5.3 with
the exception of pi and d. With a slight abuse of notation, we can define the criterion as
a two-dimensional object, L(pi, d) (viz. the other elements of θ are fixed to their optimal
values). Panel (a) in figure 5 shows a contour plot of the criterion in the pi-d space.
The criterion appears well behaved and seems to have a global minimum at the values of
parameter estimates.
To better see that the criterion has a global minimum, we take the (lower) envelope
of the criterion L(pi, d?(pi)). d?(pi) is defined as a solution to the first-order condition
Ld(pi, d) = 0. In practice, d
?(pi) is found as the level of d for a given pi that minimizes the
criterion. Panel (b) plots L(pi) against pi. One can clearly see that the function is strictly
concave.
F Results with Heterogeneous Job-destruction Rates
G Counterfactuals
G.1 Model specification
In a model with a nontransferable cost of prejudice, the expressions for the value functions
remain unaltered and are given by equations (1), (2), (3) and (4). However, as the cost of
prejudiced is no longer transferable from the employer to the worker, it is not present in
the match surplus expression or in the wage equation, which are now written as follows:
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Figure 5: Separate Identification of pi and d
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Table 6: Parameter Estimates
A. No college B. Some college
Deltas Discrim. Skills Bench. Deltas Discrim. Skills Bench.
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
pi .646 .648 .899 .678
(.147) (.067) (.060) (.255)
d 8.96 9.24 8.27 3.23
(1.92) (1.48) (1.32) (1.64)
s -.068 .000 -.171 -.137
(.038) (.024) (.020) (.004)
λ .613 1.20 1.23 1.20 .422 1.44 1.26 1.21
(.061) (.070) (.111) (.047) (.460) (.431) (.226) (.200)
µ 3.62 3.87 3.68 3.87 4.03 4.02 4.25 4.33
(.062) (.166) (.061) (.089) (.306) (.107) (.096) (.275)
σh .131 .106 .151 .106 .160 .153 .149 .134
(.012) (.019) (.015) (.008) (.144) (.019) (.012) (.034)
σx .613 .572 .441 .572 .494 .432 .474 .485
(.037) (.029) (.039) (.039) (.019) (.023) (.038) (.036)
b 7.83 6.93 8.27 6.93 7.44 6.32 7.29 6.72
(.694) (.708) (.909) (.746) (1.788) (.426) (.465) (1.593)
G .932 .957 .957 .957 .954 .974 .976 .976
(.064) (.008) (.021) (.053) (.146) (.153) (.030) (.078)
δ1 .041 .040 .040 .039 .018 .018 .018 .018
(.002) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001)
δ2 .076 .074 .071 .074 .047 .048 .046 .046
(.008) (.007) (.007) (.008) (.006) (.008) (.007) (.007)
Notes.—Estimation by SMM of the three specifications.
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Sji (h, x) =
fi(h, x)− ρUi(h)− ρV j(x)
ρ+ δ
, (30)
wji (h, x) = β
[
f(h, x)− ρV j (x)]+ (1− β) ρUi (h) . (31)
Because prejudice employers have to incur the total cost of prejudice when they match
with a black worker, a prejudiced employer will only match with a black worker if his flow
surplus in that match is greater than the psychic cost d:42
αji (h, x) = 1
{
(1− β)[fi(h, x)− ρUi(h)− ρV j(x)] > d1[(i,j)=(2,P )]
}
. (32)
Finally, in equilibrium, the reservation values of prejudiced employers and black work-
ers are given by the following equations:
V P (x) =
−κ+ λF (1−β)
ρ+δ
∑
i={1,2}
∫
αji (h, x)
[
fi(h, x)− d1−β1[i=2] − ρUi(h)
]
ui(h)
u1+u2
dh
ρ+ ρλ
F (1−β)
ρ+δ
∑
i={1,2}
∫
αji (h, x)
ui(h)
u1+u2
dh
, (33)
U2(h) =
b+ λ
W β
ρ+δ
∑
j={N,P}
∫
αj2(h, x) [fi(h, x)− ρV j(x)] v
j(x)
vP+vN
dx
ρ+ ρλ
W β
ρ+δ
∑
j={N,P}
∫
αj2(h, x)
vj(x)
vP+vN
dx
. (34)
42Note that this is the relevant match feasibility condition since (1 − β)SP2 (h, x) > d ⇒ SP2 (h, x) >
d/(1− β) > 0. for d > 0.
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